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Abstract 
This paper studies local economic impacts of the increases in trade barriers associated with 
Brexit. Predictions of the local impact of Brexit are presented under two different scenarios, 
soft and hard Brexit, which are developed from a structural trade model. Average effects are 
predicted to be negative under both scenarios, and to be more negative under hard Brexit. The 
spatial variation in negative shocks across areas is higher in the latter case as some local areas 
are particularly specialised in sectors that are predicted to be badly hit by hard Brexit. Areas 
in the South of England, and urban areas, are harder hit by Brexit under both scenarios. 
Again, this pattern is explained by sector specialisation. Finally, the areas that were most 
likely to vote remain are those that are predicted to be most negatively impacted by Brexit. 
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1. Introduction 
In the run up to the UK-EU membership referendum in 2016 a number of studies examined 
the potential consequences of Brexit for the UK economy. Most mainstream studies, for 
example Dhingra et al. (2016a), Ebell and Warren (2016) and OECD (2016), predicted that 
Brexit would have a negative impact on UK GDP. Dhingra et al. (2016a) predicted annual 
costs of £850 per household with a ‘soft Brexit’ and £1,700 per household with a ‘hard 
Brexit’. Unsurprisingly these predicted effects are magnified in the long-run (to £4,200 and 
£6,400, respectively). In the soft Brexit scenario these results are driven by increases in non-
tariff barriers and the exclusion of the UK from further EU market integration, while 
allowing for some savings in the UK fiscal contribution to the EU. In the hard Brexit 
scenario, greater losses occur because of additional increases in non-tariff barriers, as well as 
the introduction of bilateral trade tariffs, but there are greater savings in the UK fiscal 
contribution to the EU than under the soft Brexit scenario.1 
Existing studies examine a number of additional impacts, including foreign 
investment (Dhingra et al., 2016b; OECD (2016), immigration (Dhingra et al., 2016c; Ebell 
et al., 2016) and the distributional impacts across income groups (Breinlich et al. 2016). But 
existing studies have paid very little attention to the way in which those impacts are likely to 
vary across different parts of the UK. To the best of our knowledge, Dhingra et al. (2017) 
provides the first model-based analysis of the local welfare impacts of Brexit. They report 
differences in predicted effects across all Local Authority Areas and Primary Urban Areas, as 
well as providing some initial analysis on whether these predicted impacts are likely to 
exacerbate or alleviate existing disparities.  
This short paper reproduces the Local Authority estimates, provides additional 
discussion of methodological details and highlights a number of issues that will need to be 
                                                 
1  Precise definitions of these two scenarios are given in Appendix A1. 
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addressed to provide a more accurate description of the way in which local areas are likely to 
be differentially affected by Brexit. In particular, we highlight a number of methodological 
issues, such as the general equilibrium adjustment of the spatial economy, that need to be 
addressed to refine estimates of the impact of rising trade costs associated with Brexit. 
Predictions on the economic consequences of Brexit should be of substantive interest for both 
central and local government in understanding how different areas might be affected by 
Brexit and in designing the appropriate policy response. There has also been considerable 
interest in how the predicted economic impacts of Brexit correlate with voting patterns from 
the referendum.2  
The predictions reported in this paper are based on further developing the 
methodology used in the national level analysis of Dhingra et al. (2016a), in particular 
making it suitable for deriving estimates of local impact. Their multi sector computable 
general equilibrium trade model generates sectoral impacts under different scenarios (i.e. 
hard and soft Brexit). This state-of-the-art model of the world economy explains trade 
patterns well and accounts for the interdependence across sectors through complex supply 
chains. Using the most comprehensive data on trade flows and trade barriers available, their 
model provides estimates for the impact of different Brexit scenarios on trade volumes, 
sectoral production and real economic activity.3 Dhingra et al. (2017) use these sectoral 
impacts weighted using area employment shares to estimate the overall area level effects that 
we use in this paper. 
These comments notwithstanding, a number of important caveats and methodological 
challenges remain. We discuss these in detail in section 3 and consider how future work 
might tackle some of these issues and how they apply to these results. It is important to note 
that the predicted sectoral impacts are model dependent and so we would urge  caution in 
                                                 
2  See, for example, some of the contributions in Baldwin (2016) and Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2017). 
3  Dhingra et al. allow for multiple sectors and tradeable intermediate inputs and focus on the case of 
perfect competition which has been shown to provide a lower bound to the effects of changes in trade costs. 
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placing strong weight on the estimated impact for any particular sector. To give just one 
example, the model focuses on international trade and will therefore underestimate losses in 
sectors, such as air transport, where foreign investment requirements are more important than 
trade barriers in determining market access.  
It is possible to have more confidence in the area level results, where the employment 
share weighting helps ‘wash-out’ some of the sector-specific errors. If the sector-specific 
errors are random, after accounting for intersectoral input-output linkages, then averaging 
across sectors within a region gives a more accurate prediction of the area level impacts of 
increased trade barriers. Even so, it must be emphasised that these area level results only 
predict the ‘immediate impact’ based on current employment shares. Just as with the financial 
crisis, there are good reasons to think that adjustment of the spatial economy will have 
significant implications for understanding long run differences in the impact across areas. 
The results show, as with the previous research, that the effect for all areas is negative 
under both scenarios and more negative under hard Brexit. This is not surprising given that 
the same sectoral effects that underpinned predictions of the national impact are also used to 
predict the area level results. Of more interest is the fact that the variability of shocks at the 
Local Authority level is considerably higher under hard Brexit than under soft Brexit (the 
estimated standard deviation of spatial shocks being 0.19% for soft Brexit, 0.40% for hard 
Brexit). This suggests that some Local Authorities are particularly specialised in sectors that 
are predicted to be badly hit by hard Brexit.  The interaction of area level sectoral 
employment shares with exposure of the relevant sectors determines the predicted losses for a 
particular area. Contrary to previous work by Los et al. (2017), areas in London and the 
South East see the biggest negative impacts.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 provide further 
comparisons to existing studies, and outline why we think that the approach we adopt here is 
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likely to provide better ex-ante predictions. Section 4 first reports estimates of the local 
economic effects of Brexit using this approach, then moves on to show that areas that were 
more likely to vote remain are those that are predicted to be most negatively impacted by 
Brexit. It also reports that negative impacts of Brexit tend to be bigger for areas with higher 
average wages. In the discussion of these findings, we highlight the parallel with the financial 
crisis, and specifically the contrast between the immediate and long run impacts (which saw 
London and the South East hit hardest before recovering much more strongly than other areas 
of the UK). This suggests that even though the immediate negative impacts are smaller in 
poorer regions, households in those areas begin poorer and may experience considerably 
more difficulty in adjusting to those negative shocks. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
There is now a wealth of literature predicting the short and long term macroeconomic effects 
of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. Almost all studies predict that the effect 
on UK welfare will be negative for any potential deal that is negotiated between the two 
parties (Dhingra et al., 2017; Brakman et al., 2017; Ebell and Warren, 2016; HM Treasury, 
2016; OECD, 2016; Oxford Economics, 2016; PWC, 2017; Van Reenen, 2017).4 
The magnitude of the effect depends on the terms under which the UK leaves the EU. 
Broadly, the economic impacts are predicted to be most severe under a so-called ‘hard 
Brexit’, whereby there are no trade agreements between the UK and the EU and trade rules 
are determined by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The least costly outcome occurs 
when the UK remains a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). Dhingra et al. 
(2017) use a state-of-the-art quantitative general equilibrium trade model to estimate the long 
term costs of Brexit relative to a counterfactual situation where the UK remains in the EU. 
                                                 
4  The one exception is ‘Economists for Brexit’, who predict that Brexit will benefit the UK economy 
(Minford, 2016). 
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They find that UK welfare losses range from 1.3% under soft Brexit to 2.7% under hard 
Brexit. Using the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM), HM Treasury 
(2016) predict negative effects ranging between 3.8% and 7.5%, while OECD (2016) predicts 
a counterfactual reduction of between 2.7% and 7.7%. Ebell and Warren (2016) use the same 
model, finding that GDP is expected to fall by 1.5% to 3.7%, wages will by between 2.2% 
and 6.3%, and consumption will reduce by 2.4% to 5.4%. While all above estimates are based 
on the same NiGEM model, different assumptions are made on the magnitudes of trade, FDI 
and productivity losses associated with Brexit, and this drives the differences in results. 
When including a 5% long-run decline in productivity to their baseline ‘hard’ scenario, Ebell 
and Warren (2016) estimates that the losses are between 1.8% and 7.8%, while PWC (2017) 
predicts costs of 1.2% to 3.5%. Reductions in trade are the main driver of these significant 
long-run costs, resulting from increases in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Brakman et 
al. (2017) use a general equilibrium model to predict that UK value added exports will fall by 
13% under soft Brexit and 17% under hard Brexit.  
The aforementioned estimates from Dhingra et al (2017) are based on a long run static 
model, while HM Treasury (2016), OECD (2016) and the second set of estimates from Ebell 
and Warren (2016) include dynamic productivity impacts. Dhingra et al. (2017) also compute 
a data driven dynamic model. When accounting for the dynamic effects, the overall welfare 
costs rise to between 6.3% and 9.4% of GDP. These figures concern only the UK economy; 
there will also be direct and indirect effects to other global economies both inside and outside 
the EU. These individual country effects may be positive or negative. For example, Dhingra 
et al. (2017) estimate that the welfare of Ireland is predicted to decline by as much as 2.4% 
under hard Brexit. Countries outside of the EU are expected to experience small gains from 
Brexit, but the overall world economy is negatively affected. 
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To date, there are few studies that discuss the likely spatial variation of the welfare 
costs that will result from Brexit and how this correlates with voting patterns. The literature 
that does exist makes contrasting predictions. Los et al. (2017) predict that London and the 
South East will be less affected by Brexit than the rest of the country, while the blog by 
Winters (2016) argues the opposite. Demos (2017) argues that London will suffer most from 
stricter immigration rules, but the North East and Wales will experience the greatest loss of 
goods exports to the EU. A common theme across all reports is that the impacts on London 
and the rest of the country are predicted to be distinctly different.  
All three of these existing papers base their predictions of the likely spatial impact on 
measures of ‘exposure’ to Brexit. Los et al. (2017) provides the most complicated assessment 
of exposure. They use data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), merged with 
Eurostat’s estimated regional accounts to calculate the share of local economic activity that is 
dependent on trade with the rest of the EU. They use historical data to construct two variables 
for each sector in each UK region. The first is the percentage of sectoral value-added in a 
region that can be attributed to consumption and investment demand in the rest of the EU, 
which they term ‘EU dependence’. The second variable is the percentage of regional GDP 
that is generated in that sector. They use these to calculate total EU dependence for each 
region and assume that the effect of Brexit will be proportional to EU dependence.  
Their key finding is that regions that voted more strongly to leave the EU tended to be 
the same regions with greatest levels of dependency on European markets for their local 
economic activity. They find a clear positive correlation between the proportion of leave 
voters and the share of local GDP that is driven by investment and consumption demand in 
the rest of the EU. There is a similar trend when using labour income shares instead of GDP. 
Furthermore, London and the South East are expected to be the least affected, with just over 
7% of London’s GDP coming from trade with the EU - lower than any other region of the 
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UK. They therefore argue that London is the region of the UK that is least dependent on the 
EU.  
Our findings differ from those of Los et al. (2017) for two key reasons. We account 
for differences across industries in the extent to which they can substitute for EU imports 
from domestic or other sources, and for differences across sectors in the levels of trade 
barriers that would come into being when the UK leaves the EU. Los et al. (2017) use model 
generated measures of the region's exposure to trade, while we use the data on national 
exposure to trade for each sector. The regional variation in trade exposure is small such that 
the differences across regions are likely to be strongly influenced by differences in sectoral 
shares. In our methodology, the sectoral effects would also be weighed by the different 
changes in trade costs and different elasticities of substitution across sources and destinations.  
Our findings are more in line with the arguments put forward by Winters (2016), who 
suggests that London and the South East might be most negatively affected by Brexit. 
Overman and Winters (2005, 2011) provide two reasons for why London and the South East 
might be most negatively affected. The first is that the EU is clustered around the South and 
East coasts of the UK so trade tends to be concentrated in these ports. As trade moves away 
from the EU, losses will be greater in these areas, and trade will begin to disperse to other 
ports. The second argument is that the composition of trade across industries will change 
when the UK leaves the EU. Trade barriers within and outside Europe are generally higher 
for services. Therefore, if the UK leaves the Single Market as expected, areas specializing in 
services will be more adversely affected than those specializing in goods. Export demand for 
manufacturing, which generates the greatest income shares in the North East, North West, 
East Midlands, and Wales, is expected to fall less than for services after the UK leaves the 
Single Market and maintains a free trade area. Barriers to trade in services are likely to 
increase most significantly, so that areas with high importance of manufacturing exports will 
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benefit relative to areas with specialisation in services. Our empirical work considers these 
channels and helps quantify the impact of these changes. 
Demos (2017) argue that London, which has nearly 17% of its workforce coming 
from the EU, will be most affected by limitations on migration after Brexit. London and the 
South West however have the lowest percentage of exports going to the EU, so would lose 
less through trade compared to regions like Wales which exports a greater share of its gross 
value added to the EU. In our methodology, the share of exports to the EU is not the only 
factor determining how Brexit affects regional economies. We also account for the fact that 
sectors differ in how their trade costs would rise after Brexit and how easy it might be to 
substitute away from the EU.  
Our paper is also related to the growing literature explaining trends and regional 
variation in the voting patterns of the EU referendum. Local economic conditions were an 
important factor in determining voting patterns (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016; Becker et al. 
2016; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016; Zoega, 2016). Regions 
with larger shares of lower-skilled or manufacturing employment, a greater historical role of 
manufacturing, and higher unemployment were all more likely to vote for Brexit (Becker et 
al., 2016). Bell and Machin (2016) report that Local Authorities with lower median wages 
voted more strongly to leave the EU. Coyle (2016) suggests that regions that were perceived 
to have benefited more from globalisation were less likely to vote leave. London and its 
surrounding areas, the South and Scotland voted most strongly to remain. Using individual-
level data, Colantone and Stanig (2016) show that support for the Leave option in the 
referendum regarding European Union membership of the United Kingdom was 
systematically higher in regions hit harder by economic globalization. Conversely however, 
Becker et al (2016) find that exposure to the EU in terms of immigration and trade has little 
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explanatory power on the referendum vote, once many of these other factors are controlled 
for. 
 
3. Methodology 
Modelling Approach 
The underlying methodology for predicting the sectoral impact of Brexit is described in 
Dhingra et al. (2016a). They estimate the effect of Brexit on the UK’s trade and living 
standards using a modern quantitative trade model of the global economy. Quantitative trade 
models incorporate the channels through which trade affects consumers, firms and workers, 
and provide a mapping from trade data to welfare. The model provides predictions for how 
much real incomes change under different trade policies, using readily available data on trade 
volumes and potential trade barriers. A broad outline of the model is given below but readers 
are referred to Dhingra et al. (2016a) for more detail. 
The representative household in country j has an infinite horizon with time discount 
factor ρ∈(0, 1). Under constant unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the household’s 
intertemporal welfare is ∑t=0∞ ρtlncjt where cjt is the real consumption in year t and t=0 is the 
year in which Brexit takes place. We compare the present value of future consumption 
between two counterfactuals: soft versus hard Brexit and the status quo of no Brexit. The 
welfare effect of Brexit, δjBrexit , can be measured in equivalent variation terms as the 
permanent proportional change in the level of consumption in the status quo that would make 
the representative household in country j indifferent between the Brexit and the status quo. 
This can be expressed as 
lnδjBrexit=(1-ρ)�ρt∞t=0 �lnc^jtBrexit-lnc^jtStatusquo� (1) 
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where c^jtStatusquo= cjtStatusquo cj0�  and cjtBrexit �1+gj� cj0�  are the changes in real consumption in 
period t compared to period 0 for country j if the UK remains and after the UK leaves, 
respectively. To account for changes in fiscal transfers between the UK and the EU, the real 
consumption in the case of Brexit is multiplied by 1+gj where gj is the percentage change in 
the net fiscal transfer received by country j after Brexit. For example, if the UK made a lower 
transfer to the EU after Brexit, gj would be positive for the UK while for the remaining EU 
countries it would be negative since they would need to fill the budget hole left by the lower 
UK contribution.  
The representative household consumes a Cobb-Douglas basket of the goods cj=∏ cj,sβj,sSs=1   supplied by S different sectors, indexed by s = 1,2,...,S. The Cobb-Douglas 
weights βj ,s denote the share of sector s in household j’s expenditure, where 0<βj ,s<1 and 
∑ βj,s = 1Ss=1 . Dhingra et al. (2016a) model what would happen to welfare measured by 
changes in real consumption per capita ĉjt when trade costs change as a result of Brexit. The 
bilateral trade obstacles between two countries i and j are denoted by τij which can arise due 
to geography and other barriers. Then the question is: what happens to δjBrexit when τij ,s 
changes from Brexit? The trade costs τij ,s between the UK and the EU rise after Brexit, and 
the precise numbers for each Brexit scenario can be specified through these changes in trade 
costs.  
Lower trade costs reduce the cost of doing business internationally and increase 
bilateral exports. The direct impact of a rise in the trade cost of a sector after Brexit would be 
to reduce the value of bilateral trade with the EU in that sector. Trade models also account for 
the indirect impacts of trade costs on welfare through value chain linkages, competition for 
factors of production and other product markets. Dhingra et al. (2016a) builds on Costinot 
and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) who show that some popular trade models predict the same 
welfare changes in response to changing trade barriers and that these welfare changes can be 
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computed using data on trade volumes and trade elasticities. The predicted elasticity of real 
consumption to trade costs in these models (with a hat denotes a prediction) is:  
c^jt= 1-πj01-πjt � (λ^jj,k)-βj,saj,sk ϵk⁄Ss,k=1  (2) 
In (2), λjj ,s is the share of country j’s expenditures in sector s going to domestically supplied 
goods, πj0 and πjt are the shares of tariff revenue in country j’s aggregate expenditures in the 
two scenarios, aj,sk is the elasticity of the price index in sector s with respect to changes in the 
price of sector k. The price elasticities are given by the elements of the S×S Leontief inverse 
matrix �I-Aj�-1 which contain the input shares of each sector. The terms εk are the “trade 
elasticities”, which measure the percentage change in imports relative to domestic demand 
resulting from a one percent change in bilateral trade costs, holding incomes constant.5 They 
are referred to as trade elasticities because this class of models gives a gravity equation of 
trade, from which this elasticity can be obtained using data on sector-level bilateral trade 
flows and trade costs. Having estimated these trade elasticities, the impact of Brexit-induced 
trade cost changes on welfare can be estimated with available data on initial expenditure 
shares, sectoral consumption shares, input-output tables and the income levels of different 
countries. We therefore re-estimate the model presented in Dhingra et al. (2016a) for the non-
oil economy to get the impact of Brexit on the gross value added of each sector in the UK.  
Brexit Scenarios 
The multi sector general equilibrium trade model generates sectoral impacts under 
different scenarios (i.e. soft and hard Brexit). Under the soft Brexit scenario, Dhingra et al. 
(2016a) assume tariffs remain at zero and non-tariff barriers increase. Tariffs remaining at 
                                                 
5  For example, the Chemicals and Chemical Products sector has a trade elasticity of 4.75. This means a 
10% increase in tariff in this sector between two countries would translate into a 0.475% reduction in the value 
of bilateral trade, holding fixed all economy-wide outcomes across countries. 
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zero would happen if the UK joins a free trade area, such as EFTA, with the EU. While tariffs 
are important in certain sectors, they would on average be under 3% for exports to the EU. 
Much of the costs of doing business across borders arises from border controls, differences in 
product regulations, legal barriers, search costs and other transaction costs for both goods and 
services. These costs are higher than tariffs for many businesses (Novy, 2013; Kee, Nicita, 
and Olarreaga, 2009), and modern trade agreements are largely about reducing these non-
tariff costs of international trade and investment. Dhingra et al. (2016a) model increases in 
non-tariff barriers under different Brexit scenarios. Finally, they also model continuing 
reductions in non-tariff barriers (NTBs) within the EU. These within EU NTBs, are assume to 
be smaller after Brexit to account for the observation that the rate of decline in intra-EU trade 
costs is approximately 20% faster than the decline in trade costs between other OECD 
countries (Mejean and Schwellnus, 2009). Much of the action in the national model comes 
from these non-tariff barriers to trade. The analysis that follows can therefore be interpreted 
as the opportunity cost of not being an EU member and missing out on 20% faster reductions 
in non-tariff barriers to trade.  
Even free trade areas cannot eliminate all the non-tariff barriers that businesses face 
when transacting across borders. Many non-tariff barriers arise because countries have 
different preferences over the regulations that they want to impose. As a result, trade deals 
can only reduce that fraction of the non-tariff barriers which can in principle be eliminated by 
policy action (so called ‘reducible’ non-tariff barriers). Berden et al. (2009, 2013) provide 
detailed calculations of the tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers. Under the soft Brexit 
scenario, Dhingra et al. (2016a) assume that non-tariff barriers increase: they go up to one 
quarter of the reducible barriers faced by US exporters to the EU (a 2.77% increase). Given 
the way in which bilateral trade costs are modelled this increase in non-tariff barriers 
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(combined with the assumption of no changes in tariff barriers) translates in to a 2.77% 
increase in bilateral trade costs between the UK and the EU.6 
The UK will also not fully benefit from further market integration of the EU. It is 
assumed that this further integration reduces within-EU non-tariff barriers 20% faster than the 
rest of the world, which now includes the UK. Therefore, in 10 years, non-tariff barriers 
within the EU are 5.63% lower. As the UK would continue to be in the Single Market, the 
fiscal savings would be small. The UK is assumed to pay 17% less in fiscal contributions to 
the EU under soft Brexit, calculated as the same proportionate saving as Norway. This is 
equivalent to 0.09% of GDP.  
Under the hard Brexit scenario, the UK and the EU are not part of a free trade 
agreement (at least immediately) and so they must charge each other the tariffs that they 
charge to other members of the World Trade Organization. This means that goods crossing 
the UK-EU border are faced with WTO Most-Favoured-Nation tariffs. Dhingra et al. (2016a) 
also assume that non-tariff barriers will be larger in the absence of a free trade agreement. 
Specifically, they are assumed to increase to three quarters of the reducible barriers faced by 
US exporters to the EU (an 8.31% increase). In the hard Brexit case, the UK and EU are not 
part of any free trade agreement and therefore must apply tariffs at the same rate as to other 
members of the WTO. This means that goods crossing the UK-EU border are faced with the 
WTO Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) tariffs. In addition to increased tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers rise further in the absence of a deep trade agreement to replace EU membership.  
Non-tariff barriers are assumed to increase to three quarters of the reducible barriers 
faced by US exporters to the EU – an increase of 8.31%. As in the soft Brexit case, the UK 
will also not fully benefit from further integration of the EU. It is assumed that these effects 
                                                 
6  The model assumes frictional barriers of the iceberg type - i.e. country 𝑖𝑖has to ship τij≥1 units its good 
for one unit to reach country j. Denoting (MFN) tariffs by 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the effect of increasing tariffs and frictional 
barriers is to increase import prices at destination, which are given by Pij=�1+tij�τijPii. 
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are larger outside of a free trade agreement and that this further integration within the EU 
reduces non-tariff barriers 40% faster than in the rest of the world such that barriers are 
12.65% lower in 10 years. But the UK also saves more – 0.31% of GDP - on fiscal 
contributions to the EU under hard Brexit.  
National to Local Numbers 
With the change in bilateral trade costs specified, the model provides a way of 
simultaneously estimating the impact on bilateral trade volumes for each sector, taking into 
account all inter-sectoral linkages through supply chains and all inter-country linkages 
through diversion of trade to other countries. As there are multiple sectors, the model 
accounts for how changes in trade costs in intermediate input sectors affect the bilateral trade 
volumes of the final goods sector. As there are more than two countries, the model also 
accounts for how a rise in bilateral trade costs with one trade partner (in this case the EU) 
could also lead to a rise in bilateral trade for countries for whom the trade costs have not 
changed (i.e. among countries outside the EU). The trade model provides a logical 
aggregation of these different interlinkages across sectors and countries, which gives a set of 
predictions about what will happen to specific industries in the two different Brexit scenarios.  
We use the estimates at a national and sectoral level as a basis for estimating spatial 
variation in the predicted trade effects of Brexit. The key principle is to use the national-level 
model described above to predict the impact of trade cost increases from Brexit on the gross 
value added (GVA) of each sector in the UK economy. Having estimated the percentage 
change in the sectoral GVA, we use the employment shares of different regions in the UK to 
predict the impact of Brexit on local economies. We weight the sector-level GVA changes 
from the national model by the proportion of workers in that sector in each local area. That is, 
to get the spatial level estimates, the predicted sector specific changes are multiplied by the 
current employment share of the sectors in each area and summed across sectors. This gives 
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the impact of Brexit on the gross value added of an area as follows: GVAShocka=∑ EmploymentShareas × NationalGVAShocksSs=1 , where a stands for an area 
(Local Authority level in the analysis below).  
It is possible to have more confidence in the area level results, where the employment 
share weighting will help ‘wash-out’ some of the sector-specific errors and hopefully give a 
more accurate prediction of the area level impacts of increased trade barriers. One concern 
might be that if there were local clusters of related sectors (such as financial services, legal 
services and accountancy) and the errors of closely related sectors were correlated, then the 
aggregation to the local level might exacerbate the noise in the estimates. This is unlikely 
because we account for the input-output linkages across sectors, so this correlation is factored 
into the estimated national level GVA impacts. Even so, it must be emphasised that these area 
level results only predict the ‘immediate impact’ based on current employment shares. Just as 
with the financial crisis, there are good reasons to think that adjustment of the spatial 
economy will have significant implications for understanding long run differences in the 
impact across areas. 
 
 
 
4. Data and Results 
Data 
The national level trade flows and tariff data for each sector-country pair are taken 
from UN Comtrade7 and the inter-industry linkages are taken from the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD).8 The latter dataset can be used to calculate the initial expenditure shares 
in each country on each sector and the income levels of different countries. The trade 
                                                 
7  See https://comtrade.un.org/  
8  See Timmer et al. (2015) for details. 
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elasticities (which measure the percentage change in imports relative to domestic demand) 
that are used to translate the changes in trade-costs into effects on economic activity are taken 
from Caliendo and Parro (2015). As their estimated trade elasticity for the coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear fuel sector is the highest, we re-estimate the sectoral effects in Dhingra 
et al. (2016a) setting the changes in this sector to zero. Our results therefore focus on the non-
oil sector of the UK economy. The trade elasticities are sector-specific for goods sectors, but 
is constant for the service sector where the trade elasticity is set to be 5, the median value in 
the literature, following Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013).  
The hard Brexit scenario uses Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs at the WIOD 
sector level for both UK and EU imports and exports. These are calculated as weighted 
averages of the MFN tariffs reported in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Statistics 
database,9 with weights taken from the WIOD and UN Comtrade databases.  
Employment shares are calculated using data from the Business Register and 
Employment Survey (BRES) mapped from 2007 SIC 5-digit level to SIC 2003 and then 
aggregated to the 31 WIOD industries. Employment shares are calculated based on reported 
data in 2015 so as to avoid possible employment decisions undertaken by firms as adjustment 
to the EU Referendum result of June 2016.  
Sector Predictions 
As per Dhingra et al. (2016a), under both hard and soft Brexit the estimated shocks to 
imports, exports and Gross Value Added (GVA) by WIOD sector are predominantly 
negative. The GVA impacts under the two different scenarios are reported in Table 2. The 
Table also shows that industry specific GVA shocks are on average lower under soft Brexit 
than under hard Brexit (the same is true for imports and exports). There is some heterogeneity 
in the responses of different sectors across the two different scenarios, however for each 
                                                 
9  http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx 
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sector the sign of the impact – positive or negative – is generally consistent.  While the 
majority of sectoral impacts are negative, positive impacts can arise. For example, if the UK 
were to opt for a hard Brexit (i.e. WTO tariffs), while replicating CAP transfers domestically, 
members of the UK agricultural industry may gain. The new highly protectionist setting 
would increase domestic demand and estimates from the National Farmers Union (Berkum et 
al, 2016)  suggest that all sub sectors (field crops, horticulture, milk, sheep/goats, cattle, pigs 
and poultry) would gain from such a setting. 
As discussed in the introduction, we would urge caution in placing strong weight on 
the estimated impact for any particular sector. We have more confidence in the area level 
results, where the employment share weighting will help ‘wash-out’ some of the sector-
specific prediction errors and it is to these that we now turn. 
Impact Across Local Authorities 
Basic summary statistics for the impacts across Local Authorities are reported in 
Table 3. In line with the national estimates, the average Local Authority level effect is 
negative under both scenarios, and more negative under hard Brexit. As discussed above, this 
is not particularly surprising given that the same sectoral effects that underpinned predictions 
of the national impact are also used to predict the Local Authority level results. The average 
Local Authority decrease in GVA is predicted to be 1 percentage point larger under hard 
Brexit than under soft Brexit (-2.12% compared to -1.14%, respectively). These figures are 
essentially unchanged if we use the median instead of the mean, suggesting that there are no 
particularly extreme predictions that drive the average effect. The figures for the 10th and 90th 
percentile are also consistent with this interpretation. 
Table 3 also reports the variance and 90th to 10th percentile difference to summarise 
the extent to which the negative effect of Brexit varies across Local Authorities under the two 
different scenarios. This highlights a more interesting finding: the variation in Local 
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Authority level shocks is considerably higher under hard Brexit than under soft Brexit. This 
suggests that some Local Authority areas are particularly specialised in sectors that are badly 
hit by hard Brexit.  
Although the variation in impact across Local Authorities is higher in the hard Brexit 
scenario, the correlation between the two scenarios is strong and positive (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.91). Figure 1, which plots Local Authority impacts under both hard and soft 
Brexit illustrates this clearly. 
Impact on Specific Local Authorities 
We now turn to the impact on specific Local Authorities. Table 4 provides a list of the 
top ten most and least affected Local Authorities under the hard Brexit scenario. The results 
for all Local Authorities are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A2. Three of the most 
negatively affected Local Authorities are within the Greater London area (City of London, 
Tower Hamlets and Islington). With the exception of Aberdeen, all the most negatively 
affected Local Authorities are in the South of England. Most of these areas have high 
employment shares (according to workplace-based estimates from the BRES) in Business 
Activities or Financial Intermediation (or both) and so are particularly badly hit by the large 
negative effects predicted for those sectors under hard Brexit. For example, the City of 
London, which is predicted to see the largest decrease in GVA under a hard Brexit (-4.3%) 
had close to 80% of its employed population working in these two sectors as of 2015.  
The ten least negatively affected regions show somewhat more geographical 
variation, although it is striking that the South of England is now somewhat under-
represented. Hounslow and Crawley do relatively well because their proximity to Heathrow 
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means a high share of employment in the Air Transport Industry, which sees only small 
losses even under hard Brexit.10  
Figure 2 shows that these findings generalise when we look at the effect across all 
Local Authorities. The figure maps the percentage change in GVA by Local Authority under 
both soft and hard Brexit. The general geographical patterns are highly similar across both 
scenarios.  A broad north-south pattern is visible, especially in terms of the concentration of 
areas most negatively affected. The pattern for those less badly effected is more dispersed. 
The map also suggests that urban Local Authorities tend to be more negatively affected 
(consistent with their employment concentration in the most negatively affected sectors). 
Areas in London and the South East which stand to experience a bigger negative impact from 
Brexit are notably those which tend to be more service industry intensive. A brief analysis of 
the employment shares in the top five LAs affected under a hard Brexit reveal that the most 
prominent industry in all five is Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Business 
Activities, while Financial Intermediation also features prominently.  
Bigger negative effects for these areas reflect these sectoral shares and the interplay 
between pre-existing sectoral trade volumes (and thus exposure) and the sector specific trade 
elasticites. The UK runs a trade surplus in services with the EU, (over $68bn in 2011) and 
Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Business Activities along with Financial 
Intermediation account for more than two thirds of the UK’s services trade with the EU. The 
UK’s trade surplus in services with the rest of the world is considerably smaller ($28.1bn). In 
short, these sectors are very exposed to the EU market. In addition, in line with the evidence 
discussed above, the trade elasticities for all services is set to 5, meaning that a 1% increase 
in trade costs would result in a 5% decrease in imports relative to domestic demand. Pulling 
                                                 
10  Remember however that the model focuses on international trade and, as noted in the introduction, will 
therefore underestimate losses in sectors, such as air transport, where foreign investment requirements are more 
important than trade barriers in determining market access. 
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this together: Large employment shares, combined with high exposure and trade elasticities 
make for bigger predicted impacts. 
These results are consistent with studies that focus more specifically on the service 
sector. Under a hard Brexit the UK’s services trade would be subject to WTO rules, and 
compared to the EU (and to goods trade) the WTO has made considerably less progress 
liberalising trade in services.  A review of studies by Berden and Francois (2015) found that 
the trade cost equivalent (TCE) (i.e. the synthetic ad-valorem tariff equivalent) on services 
trade between the EU and US range between 8.5% and 47.3%, with specific sectors such as 
business services and financial services facing on average around 30% TCE. All studies 
reviewed conclude that NTBs matter more for trade, and more so than tariffs which apply to 
goods (Datta and Dhingra 2017). In the presence of a dominant services sector and complex 
global supply chains, deep trade deals raise trade volumes by reducing the divergence in 
standards and rights to operate across countries. The EU's Single Market is the deepest trade 
agreement that limits the regulatory discontinuities across countries, leading to lower costs of 
doing business across borders. Using goods and services trade data, Dhingra et al. (2017) 
estimate that the non-tariff clauses regarding services and investment in deep trade deals have 
almost three times bigger impacts on raising trade volumes in the services sector, compared 
to goods trade. Moreover, the trade expansion effects of deep trade agreements are driven by 
these clauses, rather than shallow clauses such as tariff reductions. Research by London First 
(2016)11 reaches similar conclusions, suggesting that EU services liberalisation has increased 
UK trade between £212 billion and £400 billion a year. In short, the fact that the most 
negative area effects arise from large negative shocks predicted for some services is 
consistent with a wider empirical and policy literature. 
                                                 
11 See http://londonfirst.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Leaving-the-EU-impact-on-trade-June-
2016.pdf 
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Brexit Vote Correlations 
One obvious question arising from the overall patterns discussed above is how 
predicted impacts relate to vote shares in the referendum. Figure 3 provides an answer: areas 
that are predicted to be most negatively affected by Brexit were more likely to vote remain. 
The correlation is particularly striking for the predicted impacts under hard Brexit 
(correlation of -0.39 for hard Brexit as opposed to -0.24 for soft Brexit). Again, this finding 
differs from some existing studies because of the different geographical pattern for the places 
that are predicted to experience the most negative impacts from hard Brexit. As discussed 
above, these differences arise because mechanically extrapolating from existing trade 
exposure, ignoring differential changes in sectoral costs and different behavioural responses, 
provides significant different area level predictions. As discussed earlier, this is a reason why 
our estimated regional effects differ from Los et al. (2017).  
Area Initial Conditions 
While the results so far imply a somewhat different narrative in terms of who is likely 
to lose most from Brexit, and how this relates to voting behaviour in the referendum, it is 
important to remember that the differences in expected impacts are swamped by existing 
disparities. Even though the immediate negative impacts are predicted to be smaller in poorer 
regions, households in those areas start off poorer and may experience considerably more 
difficulty in adjusting to those negative shocks. This is shown for the example of one initial 
condition, median wage levels, in Figure 4 (the correlation is -0.23 for soft Brexit, -0.37 for 
hard Brexit).  
Finally, it is also important to appreciate that the places experiencing the biggest 
initial shock are not necessarily those that will experience the most negative effects once the 
economy has adjusted. As discussed in the introduction, we would highlight the parallel with 
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the financial crisis and specifically the contrast between the immediate and long run impacts 
(which saw London and the South East hit hardest before recovering much more strongly 
than other areas of the UK).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided predictions of the local economic impact of Brexit under two 
different scenarios. Average effects are predicted to be negative under both scenarios and 
more negative under hard Brexit. The variation in shocks across Local Authorities is 
somewhat higher under hard Brexit because some Local Authorities are particularly 
specialised in sectors that are predicted to be badly hit by hard Brexit. 
Local Authorities in the South of England, and those in urban areas, are predicted to 
be harder hit by Brexit under both scenarios. Again, this pattern is explained by the fact that 
those areas are specialised by sectors that are predicted to be badly hit by Brexit. The analysis 
shows that areas that were most likely to vote remain are those that are predicted to be most 
negatively impacted by Brexit. Negative impacts of Brexit tend to be bigger for areas with 
higher average wages.  
The spatial estimates presented in this paper offer a first attempt to look at local 
economic impacts of the increases in trade barriers that will be associated with Brexit. 
Subsequent study of the effects of differential negative local shocks from whichever Brexit 
scenario ultimately occurs will form an important research agenda. Future wage, price and 
labour market dynamics are likely be central to this, especially with respect to migration and 
skill shortages, but also with respect to automation and the adoption of new technologies and 
on employer and employee adjustment more generally. In short, these local estimates are far 
from the last word, but they do provide an initial clear indication that the economic impact of 
Brexit is likely to be felt differentially across different parts of the country. 
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Figure 1: Impact of Brexit Under The Two Different Scenarios 
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Figure 2: Maps of Percentage Decreases in Local Authority GVA 
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Figure 3: Brexit GVA Impact and Referendum Vote Share 
(a) Soft Brexit 
 
(b) Hard Brexit 
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Figure 4: Correlation of Brexit GVA Impact With Pre-Referendum Median Wage 
 
(a) Soft Brexit 
 
(b) Hard Brexit 
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Table 1: Brexit Scenarios 
 
 Soft Brexit Hard Brexit 
Tariffs Remain at zero EU’s WTO tariffs 
NTBs 2.77% Increase 8.31% Increase 
Future EU Integration Relative increase of 5.63% to 
NTBs in ten years  
Relative increase of 12.65 % 
to NTBs in ten years 
Fiscal Imapct 0.09% of GDP Saving of 
fiscal contribution 
0.31% of GDP saving of 
fiscal contribution 
 
32 
 
Table 2: Sector Specific Impacts (% change in GVA) 
 
ID WIOD Industry Soft Brexit (%) Hard Brexit (%) 
    
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 3.3 4.2 
2 Mining and Quarrying -7.3 -12.5 
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1.4 2.8 
4 Textiles and Textile Products; Leather, Leather and 
Footwear -6.8 -5.2 
5 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 9.9 15.9 
6 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 3.5 6.3 
7 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel -0.5 -0.8 
8 Chemicals and Chemical Products -8.9 -15.1 
9 Rubber and Plastics -0.4 -0.7 
10 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 0.2 0.2 
11 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.5 5.1 
12 Machinery, nec -0.1 -0.2 
13 Electrical and Optical Equipment -9.5 -6.3 
14 Transport Equipment -0.5 -0.9 
15 Manufacturing, nec; Recycling 0.9 2.5 
16 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply -1.1 -2.1 
17 Construction -1.4 -2.6 
18 Retail Sale of Fuel; Wholesale Trade, Commission 
Trade, including Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles -0.8 -1.6 
19 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods -1.2 -2.3 
20 Hotels and Restaurants 0.0 -0.2 
21 Inland Transport -0.6 -1.2 
22 Water Transport 4.7 9.1 
23 Air Transport 5.2 10.4 
24 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; 
Activities of Travel Agencies -1.3 -2.5 
25 Post and Telecommunications -1.8 -3.9 
26 Financial Intermediation -2.8 -6.2 
27 Real Estate Activities -1.4 -2.6 
28 Renting of M and Eq and Other Business Activities -1.7 -4.0 
29 Education -1.2 -2.2 
30 Health and Social Work -1.3 -2.4 
31 Public Admin, Defence, Soc. Security and other 
Public Svc -1.1 -2.3 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for GVA Impacts of Brexit on Local Authorities 
  
 
 
Table 4: Most and Least Affected Local Authorities (% Change in Gross Value Added) 
 
Top 10 Soft Brexit 
(%) 
Hard 
Brexit 
(%) 
Bottom 10 Soft Brexit 
(%) 
Hard 
Brexit 
(%) 
City of London -1.9 -4.3 Eden -0.7 -1.3 
Aberdeen City -2.1 -3.7 Moray -0.7 -1.3 
Tower Hamlets -1.7 -3.6 North Lincolnshire -0.8 -1.3 
Watford -1.5 -3.1 Corby -0.8 -1.3 
Mole Valley -1.5 -3.0 Anglesey -0.6 -1.2 
East Hertfordshire -1.5 -2.8 South Holland -0.6 -1.1 
Reading -1.4 -2.8 Crawley -0.7 -1.1 
Reigate and 
Banstead -1.4 -2.8 Isles of Scilly -0.5 -1.1 
Worthing -1.5 -2.8 Melton -0.4 -0.8 
Islington -1.3 -2.8 Hounslow -0.2 -0.5 
 
 
 
  Soft Brexit (%) Hard Brexit (%) 
   
Mean -1.14 -2.12 
50th Percentile (Median) -1.16 -2.11 
10th Percentile -1.34 -2.57 
90th Percentile -0.91 -1.65 
Standard Deviation 0.19 0.40 
90th-10th Percentile Differential 
 
0.43 
 
0.92 
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Appendices 
Appendix A1: Hard and Soft Brexit and Timescales 
The soft Brexit scenario is defined by assuming that the UK remains in the Single Market and 
negotiates a deal like that of Norway with tariffs remaining at zero. However, non-tariff 
barriers are assumed to increase to one quarter of the reducible barriers faced by US exporters 
to the EU (a 2.77% increase). In addition, the UK will not fully benefit from further market 
integration of the EU. It is assumed that this further market integration reduces within EU 
non-tariff barriers 20% faster than for the rest of the world, which now includes the UK (this 
means within EU non-tariff barriers are 5.63% lower in 10 years).12 For the fiscal effect, we 
assume that UK could save 17% from its fiscal contribution to the EU (the same 
proportionate saving as Norway) – that is, approximately 0.09% of UK GDP. 
 
Hard Brexit is defined by assuming that the UK and EU trade under World Trade 
Organization (WTO) conditions after Brexit. Non-tariff barriers increase to three quarters of 
the reducible barriers faced by US exporters to the EU (an 8.31% increase). Furthermore as 
before, the UK will not fully benefit from further integration of EU. It is assumed that these 
effects are larger outside of a free trade agreement and that this further integration reduces 
within EU non-tariff barriers 40% faster than in the rest of the world which now includes the 
UK (this means within EU barriers are 12.65% lower in 10 years). For the fiscal effect, we 
assume that the UK saves more on fiscal contributions to the EU than under Soft Brexit - 
specifically, 0.31% of UK GDP. For more details, see Dhingra et al. (2017).  
 
The assumption that it takes 10 years for the non-tariff barriers (NTB) within EU to converge 
to their new levels after Brexit means that the long run predictions reported in the paper 
correspond to the new equilibrium after 10 years of further EU integration.  
 
                                                 
12  Mejean and Schwellnus (2009) provide evidence of faster market integration within the EU (based on 
faster observed price convergence). 
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Appendix A2: Full Results Table for Local Authorities 
 
Table A1 presents results for all Local Authorities under the two different scenarios. 
 
Table A1: Impact of Brexit for Local Authorities (% change Gross Value Added) 
 
Local Authority Soft Brexit 
(%) 
Hard Brexit 
(%) 
City of London -1.9 -4.3 
Aberdeen City -2.1 -3.7 
Tower Hamlets -1.7 -3.6 
Watford -1.5 -3.1 
Mole Valley -1.5 -3.0 
East Hertfordshire -1.5 -2.8 
Reading -1.4 -2.8 
Reigate and Banstead -1.4 -2.8 
Worthing -1.5 -2.8 
Islington -1.3 -2.8 
Swindon -1.5 -2.8 
Halton -1.5 -2.8 
Craven -1.4 -2.8 
Three Rivers -1.4 -2.8 
Slough -1.4 -2.8 
Brentwood -1.3 -2.8 
Wokingham -1.4 -2.8 
St Albans -1.3 -2.7 
Bracknell Forest -1.3 -2.7 
Edinburgh, City of -1.4 -2.7 
Hertsmere -1.4 -2.7 
Westminster -1.3 -2.7 
Salford -1.4 -2.7 
Eastleigh -1.6 -2.7 
South Cambridgeshire -1.5 -2.7 
Bournemouth -1.3 -2.7 
Camden -1.3 -2.7 
Trafford -1.3 -2.6 
Stockton-on-Tees -1.4 -2.6 
Bristol, City of -1.3 -2.6 
Rushmoor -1.4 -2.6 
Harrow -1.3 -2.6 
Tunbridge Wells -1.2 -2.6 
Elmbridge -1.3 -2.6 
Surrey Heath -1.3 -2.6 
Leeds -1.3 -2.6 
Ipswich -1.3 -2.6 
Kingston upon Thames -1.3 -2.6 
Hackney -1.3 -2.6 
Nottingham -1.3 -2.6 
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Basingstoke and Deane -1.4 -2.6 
Northampton -1.3 -2.6 
Bromley -1.3 -2.6 
Hart -1.4 -2.6 
Epsom and Ewell -1.2 -2.6 
Chiltern -1.3 -2.5 
Vale of White Horse -1.4 -2.5 
Milton Keynes -1.3 -2.5 
Southwark -1.2 -2.5 
Windsor and Maidenhead -1.3 -2.5 
Cheshire West and Chester -1.3 -2.5 
Lambeth -1.2 -2.5 
Runnymede -1.2 -2.5 
Brighton and Hove -1.3 -2.5 
Glasgow City -1.3 -2.5 
South Oxfordshire -1.3 -2.5 
Woking -1.3 -2.5 
Broxbourne -1.3 -2.5 
Cardiff -1.3 -2.5 
Welwyn Hatfield -1.3 -2.5 
Guildford -1.3 -2.5 
Havant -1.5 -2.5 
Dacorum -1.3 -2.5 
Croydon -1.2 -2.5 
Merton -1.2 -2.5 
Cheshire East -1.3 -2.5 
Warrington -1.3 -2.5 
Redbridge -1.2 -2.5 
Manchester -1.2 -2.5 
Barnet -1.2 -2.5 
Peterborough -1.2 -2.5 
Cambridge -1.3 -2.5 
South Gloucestershire -1.3 -2.5 
North Tyneside -1.3 -2.5 
Blaby -1.3 -2.5 
Dartford -1.3 -2.5 
Gloucester -1.4 -2.5 
Poole -1.4 -2.4 
Chelmsford -1.3 -2.4 
Wandsworth -1.2 -2.4 
Waverley -1.2 -2.4 
Broxtowe -1.3 -2.4 
Exeter -1.2 -2.4 
Harlow -1.4 -2.4 
Winchester -1.3 -2.4 
Stockport -1.3 -2.4 
Inverclyde -1.3 -2.4 
Cheltenham -1.2 -2.4 
Southend-on-Sea -1.3 -2.4 
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Darlington -1.2 -2.4 
Fareham -1.4 -2.4 
Preston -1.2 -2.4 
Liverpool -1.2 -2.4 
East Hampshire -1.3 -2.4 
Richmond upon Thames -1.1 -2.4 
Bury -1.3 -2.4 
St Edmundsbury -1.3 -2.4 
Stevenage -1.3 -2.4 
Calderdale -1.3 -2.4 
Hammersmith and Fulham -1.1 -2.4 
Middlesbrough -1.2 -2.4 
West Lothian -1.3 -2.4 
Mid Sussex -1.2 -2.3 
Lewisham -1.2 -2.3 
West Berkshire -1.2 -2.3 
Maidstone -1.2 -2.3 
Warwick -1.2 -2.3 
Bolsover -1.2 -2.3 
Sefton -1.2 -2.3 
Taunton Deane -1.2 -2.3 
Birmingham -1.2 -2.3 
Redcar and Cleveland -1.3 -2.3 
Coventry -1.2 -2.3 
Sevenoaks -1.2 -2.3 
Wycombe -1.2 -2.3 
Broadland -1.2 -2.3 
North West Leicestershire -1.3 -2.3 
Test Valley -1.2 -2.3 
Sutton -1.1 -2.3 
Havering -1.2 -2.3 
Waltham Forest -1.2 -2.3 
Epping Forest -1.2 -2.3 
Norwich -1.2 -2.3 
Thurrock -1.2 -2.3 
Shepway -1.2 -2.3 
Lincoln -1.2 -2.3 
Knowsley -1.2 -2.3 
Solihull -1.1 -2.3 
Tonbridge and Malling -1.1 -2.3 
North Hertfordshire -1.3 -2.3 
The Vale of Glamorgan -1.3 -2.3 
East Renfrewshire -1.2 -2.3 
Wiltshire -1.2 -2.3 
York -1.1 -2.3 
Renfrewshire -1.3 -2.3 
Rushcliffe -1.1 -2.3 
Harrogate -1.1 -2.3 
Aylesbury Vale -1.2 -2.3 
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Swansea -1.2 -2.3 
Horsham -1.2 -2.2 
Rossendale -1.4 -2.2 
Wirral -1.2 -2.2 
South Bucks -1.1 -2.2 
Newham -1.1 -2.2 
Enfield -1.2 -2.2 
Bedford -1.2 -2.2 
Portsmouth -1.2 -2.2 
Haringey -1.2 -2.2 
Greenwich -1.1 -2.2 
West Dunbartonshire -1.2 -2.2 
Bolton -1.2 -2.2 
Newcastle upon Tyne -1.1 -2.2 
Chorley -1.2 -2.2 
Ashford -1.2 -2.2 
Tandridge -1.1 -2.2 
Spelthorne -1.1 -2.2 
Rugby -1.2 -2.2 
Aberdeenshire -1.2 -2.2 
Bath and North East Somerset -1.1 -2.2 
Castle Point -1.2 -2.2 
Medway -1.2 -2.2 
Thanet -1.3 -2.2 
Doncaster -1.2 -2.2 
Derby -1.2 -2.2 
Bromsgrove -1.1 -2.2 
Stafford -1.3 -2.2 
Lancaster -1.1 -2.2 
Gateshead -1.2 -2.2 
Great Yarmouth -1.2 -2.2 
Bexley -1.1 -2.2 
Rochdale -1.3 -2.2 
Canterbury -1.1 -2.2 
East Cambridgeshire -1.3 -2.2 
North Lanarkshire -1.2 -2.2 
Mansfield -1.2 -2.2 
Charnwood -1.3 -2.1 
Eastbourne -1.1 -2.1 
Newport -1.2 -2.1 
Dundee City -1.2 -2.1 
Bradford -1.2 -2.1 
Lewes -1.2 -2.1 
Sheffield -1.2 -2.1 
West Oxfordshire -1.3 -2.1 
Staffordshire Moorlands -1.1 -2.1 
Rother -1.1 -2.1 
Brent -1.1 -2.1 
Stirling -1.1 -2.1 
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Harborough -1.1 -2.1 
South Tyneside -1.2 -2.1 
Plymouth -1.1 -2.1 
Blackburn with Darwen -1.3 -2.1 
Daventry -1.1 -2.1 
Leicester -1.2 -2.1 
East Dunbartonshire -1.1 -2.1 
Fife -1.2 -2.1 
Sunderland -1.2 -2.1 
Gravesham -1.1 -2.1 
Colchester -1.1 -2.1 
North Ayrshire -1.2 -2.1 
Tewkesbury -1.2 -2.1 
Torbay -1.1 -2.1 
Denbighshire -1.3 -2.1 
Barking and Dagenham -1.1 -2.1 
Hastings -1.2 -2.1 
Tamworth -1.2 -2.1 
North Devon -1.2 -2.1 
North East Lincolnshire -1.1 -2.1 
Fylde -1.0 -2.1 
St. Helens -1.1 -2.1 
Mendip -1.1 -2.1 
Midlothian -1.1 -2.1 
Cotswold -1.1 -2.1 
Stratford-on-Avon -1.1 -2.1 
Central Bedfordshire -1.1 -2.1 
Chesterfield -1.2 -2.1 
Bridgend -1.2 -2.1 
South Norfolk -1.1 -2.1 
Newcastle-under-Lyme -1.2 -2.1 
Rhondda, Cynon, Taff -1.2 -2.1 
East Ayrshire -1.1 -2.1 
Adur -1.1 -2.1 
South Lanarkshire -1.1 -2.1 
Ealing -1.0 -2.0 
Suffolk Coastal -1.1 -2.0 
Falkirk -1.1 -2.0 
Southampton -1.0 -2.0 
North Somerset -1.1 -2.0 
South Staffordshire -1.2 -2.0 
Lichfield -1.1 -2.0 
Oxford -1.0 -2.0 
Worcester -1.1 -2.0 
Basildon -1.1 -2.0 
Kirklees -1.2 -2.0 
Wigan -1.1 -2.0 
Nuneaton and Bedworth -1.1 -2.0 
Hartlepool -1.2 -2.0 
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Oldham -1.2 -2.0 
Scottish Borders -1.2 -2.0 
Arun -1.2 -2.0 
North Warwickshire -1.1 -2.0 
Wyre -1.1 -2.0 
New Forest -1.1 -2.0 
Stoke-on-Trent -1.1 -2.0 
Cherwell -1.1 -2.0 
County Durham -1.2 -2.0 
South Ribble -1.1 -2.0 
Redditch -1.4 -2.0 
Torfaen -1.2 -2.0 
Teignbridge -1.1 -2.0 
Gwynedd -1.1 -2.0 
Weymouth and Portland -1.0 -2.0 
Telford and Wrekin -1.1 -2.0 
Luton -1.1 -2.0 
Babergh -1.2 -2.0 
Christchurch -1.2 -2.0 
Wyre Forest -1.2 -2.0 
East Dorset -1.1 -2.0 
Northumberland -1.1 -2.0 
Mid Suffolk -1.1 -2.0 
South Northamptonshire -1.1 -2.0 
Huntingdonshire -1.1 -2.0 
Maldon -1.2 -2.0 
Malvern Hills -1.1 -1.9 
Conwy -1.0 -1.9 
Stroud -1.4 -1.9 
Wellingborough -1.1 -1.9 
Kensington and Chelsea -0.9 -1.9 
Blackpool -1.0 -1.9 
Burnley -1.1 -1.9 
King`s Lynn and West Norfolk -1.0 -1.9 
Rochford -1.0 -1.9 
Braintree -1.1 -1.9 
Walsall -1.2 -1.9 
Wakefield -1.1 -1.9 
Tendring -1.1 -1.9 
Isle of Wight -1.1 -1.9 
West Dorset -1.1 -1.9 
Highland -1.0 -1.9 
East Lothian -1.0 -1.9 
Caerphilly -1.2 -1.9 
Blaenau Gwent -1.2 -1.9 
Purbeck -1.0 -1.9 
East Riding of Yorkshire -1.0 -1.9 
Chichester -1.0 -1.9 
Breckland -1.0 -1.9 
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Perth and Kinross -0.9 -1.9 
Swale -1.0 -1.9 
Rotherham -1.1 -1.9 
Wealden -1.0 -1.9 
East Staffordshire -1.0 -1.9 
Gedling -1.2 -1.9 
Torridge -1.0 -1.9 
Clackmannanshire -1.0 -1.9 
Wolverhampton -1.1 -1.9 
Tameside -1.1 -1.9 
Gosport -1.0 -1.9 
Rutland -1.1 -1.9 
South Hams -1.0 -1.9 
South Lakeland -1.1 -1.8 
South Ayrshire -1.0 -1.8 
Cornwall -0.9 -1.8 
Kingston upon Hull, City of -1.0 -1.8 
North Dorset -1.2 -1.8 
High Peak -1.1 -1.8 
Richmondshire -0.9 -1.8 
Eilean Siar -0.9 -1.8 
Carlisle -1.0 -1.8 
Selby -1.1 -1.8 
Ceredigion -0.9 -1.8 
Ashfield -1.2 -1.8 
South Somerset -1.0 -1.8 
Kettering -1.0 -1.8 
Monmouthshire -1.0 -1.8 
Pembrokeshire -1.0 -1.8 
Hillingdon -0.9 -1.8 
Boston -1.0 -1.8 
Angus -1.1 -1.8 
East Northamptonshire -1.0 -1.8 
Mid Devon -1.1 -1.8 
Shropshire -0.9 -1.8 
Bassetlaw -1.0 -1.8 
West Devon -0.9 -1.8 
Hinckley and Bosworth -1.1 -1.7 
Derbyshire Dales -1.1 -1.7 
East Devon -0.9 -1.7 
Dudley -1.0 -1.7 
Oadby and Wigston -1.0 -1.7 
Cannock Chase -1.0 -1.7 
Barrow-in-Furness -1.0 -1.7 
South Derbyshire -0.9 -1.7 
Barnsley -0.9 -1.7 
Wrexham -1.1 -1.7 
West Lindsey -0.9 -1.7 
Dover -0.9 -1.7 
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Argyll and Bute -0.9 -1.7 
Carmarthenshire -1.0 -1.7 
Uttlesford -0.9 -1.7 
Copeland -0.9 -1.7 
South Kesteven -1.0 -1.7 
Flintshire -1.0 -1.7 
West Lancashire -0.9 -1.7 
Scarborough -0.9 -1.7 
Ribble Valley -0.9 -1.7 
Hyndburn -1.0 -1.6 
Sandwell -1.0 -1.6 
East Lindsey -0.9 -1.6 
Hambleton -0.9 -1.6 
Newark and Sherwood -0.9 -1.6 
West Somerset -0.8 -1.6 
North Kesteven -0.9 -1.6 
Powys -1.0 -1.6 
North Norfolk -0.8 -1.6 
Forest Heath -0.9 -1.6 
Orkney Islands -0.8 -1.6 
Sedgemoor -0.9 -1.6 
Shetland Islands -0.8 -1.6 
Wychavon -0.9 -1.6 
Erewash -1.0 -1.6 
Waveney -0.8 -1.5 
Pendle -1.1 -1.5 
Merthyr Tydfil -0.8 -1.5 
Herefordshire, County of -0.8 -1.5 
Dumfries and Galloway -0.7 -1.4 
Forest of Dean -0.8 -1.4 
Allerdale -0.8 -1.4 
Amber Valley -0.9 -1.4 
Fenland -0.7 -1.4 
Ryedale -0.8 -1.4 
Neath Port Talbot -1.0 -1.4 
North East Derbyshire -0.9 -1.4 
Eden -0.7 -1.3 
Moray -0.7 -1.3 
North Lincolnshire -0.8 -1.3 
Corby -0.8 -1.3 
Anglesey -0.6 -1.2 
South Holland -0.6 -1.1 
Crawley -0.7 -1.1 
Isles of Scilly -0.5 -1.1 
Melton -0.4 -0.8 
Hounslow -0.2 -0.5 
   
 
